Australia as terra nullius with no Indigenous land rights

Where in the source: “History”; transcript, heading, recital, operative declaration and date

Identifies Governor Bourke, acting under colonial authority, as the official who quashed Batman's purported purchase and publicly reserved legally effective control of land to the government on 26 August 1835.

Where in the source: heading and paragraph 11

Identifies the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and its unanimous reasons delivered by Lord Watson as the high imperial court carrying the settled-colony classification into reported Australian law in 1889.

Where in the source: paragraphs 2.26–2.30, pp. 65–66

Identifies the Northern Territory Supreme Court as the forum for Australia's first customary land-rights claim and records Blackburn J's finding of an elaborate Yolngu legal system alongside his refusal to recognise communal native title.

Where in the source: Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.18–3.26, “The doctrine of terra nullius”

The inquiry gives the institutional sequence from Bourke through Mabo and the Native Title Act, and expressly notes extinguishment and later claims-process problems. Its statement that Bourke used the term terra nullius is checked against the proclamation transcript, which uses “vacant Lands of the Crown” rather than the Latin phrase.

Where in the source: “Key points,” “Running the case” and “The decision”

Describes the two assumptions challenged by the Meriam plaintiffs—no pre-colonial ownership and complete Crown ownership through sovereignty—and explains how the case proved a living system of Meriam law and landholding.

Where in the source: transcript, recital and operative declaration

Shows the administrative mechanism directly: agreements with Aboriginal people could not create title effective against Crown rights, and the government could treat possession lacking its licence as trespass.

Where in the source: paragraph 11 and paragraphs 14–16

Shows how a broad factual classification of the colony became a choice-of-law rule: reasonably applicable English law entered from the outset because the territory was placed in the supposedly unoccupied, settled-colony class.

Where in the source: “The Gove Land Rights Case” and “The Mabo No. 2 Decision and the Native Title Act”

Explains why the Yolngu claim failed despite the finding of a settled system of law and how Mabo later recognised native title while allowing grants such as freehold to extinguish it to the extent of inconsistency.

Where in the source: paragraphs 2.41–2.48 and 4.4–4.10, pp. 68–73 and 123–124

Separates recognition from recovery: native title must derive from traditional laws and customs, connection must be substantially maintained, valid sovereign acts may extinguish it, and later interpretation makes continuity pivotal to proof.

Where in the source: Brennan J, CLR pp. 29–30, 45–48, 51 and 57–63; Mason CJ and McHugh J, CLR p. 15; final orders

The primary judgment records the institutional reversal and its limits: native title can burden Crown radical title, but depends on Indigenous law and custom, can lapse with loss of continuity and can be extinguished by inconsistent acts.

Where in the source: “Legal issues,” paragraphs on the 6–1 holding, connection and extinguishment

Confirms the date, majority, operative recognition and qualifications in an institutional native-title case summary.

Where in the source: preamble, pp. 1–3; s 3 and ss 10–15, pp. 3 and 8–10 of the authorised version

Parliament expressly recorded Mabo's rejection of terra nullius and enacted recognition and protection, while also preserving the decision's limits through extinguishment, validation and compensation provisions.