Polygraph screening as reliable detection of deception and personnel risk

Where in the source: 64 FR 70962–70963; 70976–70978, §§ 709.4 and 709.15(c)

Primary federal rule establishing DOE counterintelligence polygraph screening for specified employees, contractors, applicants and other personnel with access to sensitive information and programs.

Where in the source: 64 FR 70976–70978, §§ 709.4, 709.7–709.8 and 709.15

The rule defines covered access categories, makes access contingent on testing and assigns unresolved results to interviews, possible retesting and further counterintelligence evaluation.

Where in the source: Executive Summary, pp. 5–7, Table S-1 and the DOE screening conclusion

Scientific review finding that physiological responses measured by polygraphs are not unique to deception, that evidence for screening accuracy is extremely limited, and that employee screening creates serious false-positive and false-negative problems; it distinguishes these limitations from the above-chance performance sometimes seen in specific-incident testing. This edge supports the predicted false-suspicion and false-reassurance risks in the fourth consequence; the examples are hypothetical, not observed counts of DOE victims.

Where in the source: 71 FR 57388–57389, history and section III.A; 57393–57394, § 709.3; 57396, § 709.25

Reconstructs DOE’s policy history and establishes the 2006 framework treating polygraph results as one component of a broader counterintelligence evaluation. Section III.A describes the end of automatic general screening and expressly retains pre-existing adverse-action safeguards; the rule keeps specified triggers and random testing.

Where in the source: 10 CFR § 709.25(a)–(b)

Current codified rule prohibits DOE or its contractors from taking adverse personnel action or making adverse access recommendations solely on a significant-response or no-opinion polygraph result and bars substituting such a polygraph result for required investigation. The 2006 final rule establishes the historical date and continuity of these safeguards.

Where in the source: 71 FR 57392–57394, §§ 709.2–709.3: DOE definition and NNSA evaluation role

The replacement rule expressly includes NNSA within DOE and names NNSA in the counterintelligence-evaluation framework. This supports its role within the episode without attributing the 1999 rule to an already operating NNSA.

Where in the source: 64 FR 70976–70978, §§ 709.4, 709.7–709.8, 709.14 and 709.15(a)–(b)

Supports the first three consequences: required screening in covered access categories, consequences of refusal, and prescribed follow-up for unresolved results. These are regulatory requirements, not counts of implemented tests or adverse decisions.

Where in the source: Decree no. 146, preamble and §§ 1–5; operative clauses corroborated by the registered PRG reproduction

Official legal-bank record for the polygraph decree and its amended framework. The decree introduced polygraph testing into state service; the implementing rules define the examination as assessment of the reliability of supplied information and target official abuse, corruption-related risk, qualifications and job suitability. The implementing regulation was revised by Decree no. 9/2011; the separately registered 2011 and 2018 texts locate the substantive provisions.

Where in the source: Decree no. 9/2011, annex: regulation preamble and § 1(а), (в)–(г), public extract

The public extract defines physiological recording, assessment of supplied-information reliability and voluntary written consent; its preamble states the anti-corruption, misconduct, qualification and job-suitability purposes.

Where in the source: Decree no. 146, §§ 2–4, public text with amendments through 11 July 2018

Documents covered recruitment and appointment procedures and discretionary testing in rotation and internal investigations, supporting the first and fourth consequences. It does not measure how many people were tested.

Where in the source: Normative legal base: entry for Presidential Decree no. 146 of 27 August 2010

Current civil-service agency page listing Presidential Decree No. 146 on state-service polygraph testing among the agency’s normative legal base, supporting that the regime remains institutionally current.

Where in the source: Public decree text, preamble and §§ 1–5, amended through 11 July 2018

Corroborates the Ministry of Justice decree record with readable text identifying the State Personnel Service’s centralized implementation role and the covered recruitment, rotation and internal-investigation procedures.

Where in the source: General provisions: legal succession; Functions of the Agency: candidate testing including polygraphs

The agency regulation identifies the successor to the State Personnel Service and assigns it responsibility for polygraph testing of candidates in legally specified cases.

Where in the source: Annex to Decree no. 9/2011, preamble and § 1(а), (в)–(г), public extract

Supports the second and third consequences: physiological recording is used to assess supplied-information reliability, and the stated purposes include corruption-related risk, official abuse, qualifications and job suitability. The definition requires voluntary written consent.

Where in the source: Decree no. 150/2018, § 1: amendments to Decree no. 146, covered-post list and implementing regulation

Adds corruption-risk posts to the list and removes attestation references from the decree and regulation. These scope changes do not state that the screening inference has been scientifically corrected.

Where in the source: Executive Summary, pp. 1–7: inference from physiological responses, screening validity and future-behavior claims

Scientific review finding that physiological responses measured by polygraphs are not unique to deception, that evidence for screening accuracy is extremely limited, and that employee screening creates serious false-positive and false-negative problems; it distinguishes these limitations from the above-chance performance sometimes seen in specific-incident testing. Provides scientific context for the screening inference, not evidence of local implementation, measured harms or an institutional response.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 683 of 19 June 2014, enacting clause 1; Rules §§ 1–5 and 15–17, amended 30 May 2025

Current government rules, originally adopted in 2014, defining the purpose as checking reliability of supplied information, requiring a conclusion on the truthfulness of answers, and directing that the probabilistic/advisory result be used in recruitment, attestation, competitions and service investigations. The text incorporates 2025 amendments.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 683, Rules §§ 3–6 and 15–18; consent for service investigations in § 5-1

The rules define the personnel procedures, require answer-truthfulness conclusions and identify the bodies using the information. The judicial procedure is documented separately by Resolution no. 191.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 191 of 7 April 2016, Rules §§ 1, 3–5 and 15–17; annex 2 amendment of 14 July 2026

Current 2016 rules requiring successful judge candidates to undergo polygraph examination through the National Security Committee, with a formal conclusion on the truthfulness of answers. The current text records amendments to the declaration form adopted on 14 July 2026. This source supports the judicial-screening consequence and judicial truthfulness conclusions; the other personnel consequences require the law-enforcement rules.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 683, Rules §§ 15–18 and amendment notes for Resolution no. 388 of 30 May 2025

The amended rules retain personnel uses of probabilistic, advisory polygraph information. This edge documents the continuing framework; the separate judicial source establishes the July 2026 form amendment.

Where in the source: Executive Summary, pp. 1–7: inference from physiological responses, screening validity and future-behavior claims

Scientific review finding that physiological responses measured by polygraphs are not unique to deception, that evidence for screening accuracy is extremely limited, and that employee screening creates serious false-positive and false-negative problems; it distinguishes these limitations from the above-chance performance sometimes seen in specific-incident testing. Provides scientific context for the screening inference, not evidence of local implementation, measured harms or an institutional response.

Where in the source: Order no. 21 of 17 January 2023, enacting §§ 1–3; annexed Rules §§ 4–6, especially 6(3)

The Interior Minister’s own recruitment order assigns selection to ministry personnel bodies and expressly requires referral of candidates for polygraph examination.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 191/2016, Rules §§ 5 and 17

Identifies the High Judicial Council as the referring and receiving institution and the National Security Committee as the testing institution.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 191/2016, Rules §§ 3–5 and 15–17

Requires testing after the judicial qualification examination and sends an advisory conclusion on answer truthfulness to the High Judicial Council.

Where in the source: Resolution no. 683, Rules §§ 3–6 and 15–18; consent qualification in § 5-1

Supports consequences one, two, three and five: defined personnel screening, answer-truthfulness conclusions, specified personnel uses and forwarding suspected offences for verification. Service-investigation testing requires employee consent.

Where in the source: Judgment no. 6/2018, §§ 7–9; § 14 reproducing Law 269/2008, art. 3(4); § 15 reproducing Law 132/2016, art. 11

Primary judgment reproducing the statutory purpose of polygraph testing as assessment of the truthfulness of supplied information, documenting the 2017 exclusion of a National Integrity Authority candidate for a non-positive result, and striking the positive-result requirement after emphasizing the test’s presumptive character and low scientific certainty. The Integrity Council made the exclusion decision; the National Integrity Authority was the office concerned and a legally authorized test initiator.

Where in the source: Judgment no. 6/2018, §§ 7–9, 60–64 and 86

Documents the Council’s interpretation of the leadership-selection rule: Cârnaț’s successful written examination and interview did not overcome the requirement for a positive polygraph result.

Where in the source: Judgment no. 6/2018, §§ 7–12, 77–78, 86–93; operative points 2–3

Paragraphs 7–12 document the exclusion and litigation; paragraphs 77–78 and 86–93 explain the uncertainty of treating the test as an integrity gate. The operative ruling removed the positive-result condition while upholding mandatory testing.

Where in the source: Judgment no. 6/2018, §§ 92–93; operative points 2–3 and 5, 10 April 2018

Strikes the positive-result gate in article 11(12), but upholds article 4(a²) and article 11(10)–(11). The correction concerns leadership appointments at the National Integrity Authority and does not abolish polygraph testing generally.

Where in the source: Interior Ministry service regulation, chapter 2, §§ 9–11, especially § 10(b)

Current government service rules stating that from 1 September 2023 a psychophysiological polygraph examination forms part of the candidate investigation stage to identify negative factors preventing service; the selection and investigation stages lead to an official suitability conclusion.

Where in the source: Interior Ministry service regulation, chapter 2, § 10(b) and final suitability paragraph

The recruitment investigation stage includes polygraph testing to identify factors that can bar service; the final conclusion combines selection and investigation results. The Academy’s training role is documented by its separate report.

Where in the source: 16 August 2026 report: paragraphs beginning “Mashgʻulotlar davomida”, “Amaliy mashgʻulotlarda” and “Oʻquv kursi yakunida”

Official 16 August 2026 report on specialist polygraph training. It states that training addressed assessment of applicant risk factors and identification of employees’ propensity toward corruption and other misconduct, alongside practical interpretation of psychophysiological reactions. The closing paragraph records examinations and certificates for successful participants. This supports the training and certification consequences; the service regulation documents recruitment.

Where in the source: 16 August 2026 report: publication date and training-purpose paragraphs

The Academy reports current specialist training in polygraph examination and personnel-risk assessment, documenting continued institutional use.

Where in the source: Executive Summary, pp. 1–7: inference from physiological responses, screening validity and future-behavior claims

Scientific review finding that physiological responses measured by polygraphs are not unique to deception, that evidence for screening accuracy is extremely limited, and that employee screening creates serious false-positive and false-negative problems; it distinguishes these limitations from the above-chance performance sometimes seen in specific-incident testing. Provides scientific context for the screening inference, not evidence of local implementation, measured harms or an institutional response.

Where in the source: 16 August 2026 report, title, training aims and Academy information-service attribution

Identifies the Interior Ministry Academy as organizer of the course for ministry and partner law-enforcement psychologists, establishing an educational carrier role within the ministry system.

Where in the source: Service regulation, chapter 2, § 10(b) and final suitability paragraph; § 11

Supports the first two consequences: polygraph examination within recruitment investigations and inclusion of investigation results in the overall moral-professional and health suitability conclusion. It does not establish that polygraph responses alone determine hiring.

Where in the source: 16 August 2026 report, training aims and paragraphs beginning “Mashgʻulotlar davomida” and “Amaliy mashgʻulotlarda”

The Academy teaches specialists to assess applicant risk and corruption or misconduct propensity and to interpret recorded psychophysiological responses, documenting the training component of the mechanism.